

# Perspective taking reduces intergroup bias in visual representations of faces

Ryan J. Hutchings<sup>\*</sup>, Austin J. Simpson, Jeffrey W. Sherman, Andrew R. Todd<sup>\*</sup>

University of California, Davis, CA, USA

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## ABSTRACT

Intergroup biases shape most aspects of person construal, including lower-level visual representations of group members' faces. Specifically, ingroup members' faces tend to be represented more positively than outgroup members' faces. Here, we used a reverse-correlation paradigm to test whether engaging in perspective taking (i. e., actively imagining another person's mental states) can reduce these biased visual representations. In an initial image-generation experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a minimal group and then composed a narrative essay about an ingroup or an outgroup target person, either while adopting the person's perspective or while following control instructions. Afterward, they generated an image of the person's face in a reverse-correlation image-classification task. Subsequent image-assessment experiments using an explicit rating task, a sequential priming task, and an economic trust game with separate samples of participants revealed that ingroup faces elicited more likability and trustworthiness than did outgroup faces. Importantly, this pattern of intergroup bias was consistently weaker in faces created by perspective takers. Additional image-assessment experiments identified the mouth (i.e., smiling cues) as a critical facial region wherein the interactive effects of group membership and perspective taking emerged. These findings provide initial evidence that perspective taking may be an effective strategy for attenuating, though not for eliminating, intergroup biases in visual representations of what group members look like.

## 1. Introduction

A venerable literature spanning multiple areas of psychology has identified the developmental origins, the cognitive and neurobiological underpinnings, and the many judgmental and behavioral consequences of classifying other people as “us” versus “them” (Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014; Liberman, Woodward, & Kinzler, 2017; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Emerging from this research are countless demonstrations that ingroup members are commonly preferred over outgroup members (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002)—even when the basis for group membership is arbitrary, as in the minimal-group paradigm (Dunham, 2018; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). So deep-seated is such intergroup bias that it can shape most aspects of person construal, including initial impressions of group members' faces (Hehman, Stoler, Freeman, Flake, & Xie, 2019; Kawakami, Amodio, & Hugenberg, 2017).

Importantly, these initial face impressions can have meaningful outcomes for targets (see Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015, for a review). For instance, CEOs and politicians with competent-looking faces enjoy more financial success (Rule & Ambady, 2008, 2009) and electoral success (Ballew & Todorov, 2007; Todorov,

Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005), respectively, whereas convicted murderers with untrustworthy-looking faces are more likely to receive death sentences (Wilson & Rule, 2015, 2016). Documenting intergroup biases in the visual representations underlying perceivers' face impressions when they exist—and identifying potential strategies for debiasing these representations—thus may provide useful insights for pressing social issues. In the research reported here, we tested the efficacy of perspective taking as one such bias-mitigation strategy.

## 2. Intergroup bias in visual representations of faces

Accumulating evidence using reverse-correlation techniques has revealed robust patterns of intergroup bias in how people visually represent group members' faces (Brinkman, Todorov, & Dotsch, 2017). The reverse-correlation image-classification paradigm (Mangini & Biederman, 2004), which has its roots in techniques for identifying the stimulus information underlying low-level perceptual classification judgments (Ahumada & Lovell, 1971), is a data-driven approach for visualizing the specific facial features underlying face classifications. Social cognition researchers have increasingly used this paradigm to

<sup>\*</sup> Corresponding authors.

E-mail addresses: [rhutchings@ucdavis.edu](mailto:rhutchings@ucdavis.edu) (R.J. Hutchings), [atodd@ucdavis.edu](mailto:atodd@ucdavis.edu) (A.R. Todd).

elucidate the facial features underlying face classifications of different social categories, which affords visual estimates of the prototypical face of particular social groups in perceivers' minds (Brinkman et al., 2017).

In a typical two-image forced-choice (2IFC) reverse-correlation image-classification task (Dotsch & Todorov, 2012), participants in an *image-generation* phase complete hundreds of trials in which they select which of two noise-laden face images more closely resembles their internal representation of a person according to a dimension of interest. For example, participants may view several hundred pairs of face images and select which image looks more like a Moroccan person (Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, & van Knippenberg, 2008). The noise patterns selected by a given participant are then combined with the underlying base face to create a classification image (CI) corresponding to that participant's visual depiction of Moroccan faces.<sup>1</sup> Then, in a separate *image-assessment* phase, a naïve sample of participants rates the CIs on one or more dimensions of interest (e.g., a trait, such as trustworthiness). The responses of these image raters provide insights into the minds of the image generators—for example, that their visual representations of Moroccan faces look untrustworthy (Dotsch et al., 2008).

Experiments using this paradigm have documented a variety of intergroup biases in visual representations of social groups. Specifically, representations of ingroup faces tend to look more positive than do representations of outgroup faces. For example, Europeans generate untrustworthy-looking visual representations of Moroccan and Chinese faces (Dotsch et al., 2008), and Republicans generate more favorable representations of Republican politicians than Democrats do (Young, Ratner, & Fazio, 2014). Such biases even extend to minimal group members' faces. In one study, participants were randomly assigned to a minimal group (dot over-estimators or under-estimators) and then generated a representation of an ingroup member's face or an outgroup member's face (Ratner, Dotsch, Wigboldus, van Knippenberg, & Amodio, 2014). Separate samples of participants explicitly ascribed more positive (and fewer negative) traits to ingroup versus outgroup faces, implicitly evaluated ingroup faces more positively than outgroup faces, and displayed more trusting behavior toward ingroup versus outgroup faces in an economic trust game. These and other findings (e.g., Bjornsdottir, Yeretsian, West, & Rule, 2019; Brown-Iannuzzi, Dotsch, Cooley, & Payne, 2017; Hong & Ratner, 2021; Lei & Bodenhausen, 2017; Paulus, Rohr, Dotsch, & Wentura, 2016; Petsko, Lei, Kunst, Bruneau, & Kteily, 2020) attest to the prevalence of intergroup bias in visual representations of faces.

### 3. Perspective taking and intergroup bias reduction

Abundant research has explored strategies for reducing various forms of intergroup bias (Paluck & Green, 2009). To our knowledge, however, no studies have examined strategies for reducing intergroup bias in visual representations of group members' faces, making it unclear whether strategies known to reduce biases in *conceptual* representations of a group also produce shifts in *visual* representations of that group and its members. Indeed, few studies have examined situational influences of any kind on visual representations of social groups (for an exception, see Krosch & Amodio, 2014). Here, we examined the viability of perspective taking (i.e., actively imagining another person's mental states) as a strategy for attenuating intergroup biases in visual representations of

group members' faces.

Evidence from multiple studies suggests that perspective taking can temper both overt and covert expressions of intergroup bias (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Broockman & Kalla, 2016; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Shih, Wang, Trahan, & Stotzer, 2009; Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011; see Ku, Wang, & Galinsky, 2015; Todd & Galinsky, 2014, for reviews). In one set of studies, for example, implicit evaluative biases toward Turkish people, Black people, and older adults were weaker among participants who, in a preceding task, had actively adopted the perspective of an individual Turkish, Black, or older adult target, respectively (Todd & Burgmer, 2013). Insofar as these positive effects of perspective taking on conceptual representations of group members are also apparent in visual prototypes that guide initial impression formation (Brinkman et al., 2017), the potential impact of perspective taking may be wide-ranging on downstream forms of intergroup bias that are built upon those visual prototypes.

One reason for perspective taking's effectiveness in reducing intergroup bias is that, much like other de-biasing strategies that prompt deviation from default modes of information processing (e.g., Kleiman, Hassin, & Trope, 2014; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984), actively imagining the world from another person's point of view encourages perceivers to step outside their usual mental routines and to represent and process social information differently than they typically do (Todd, Galinsky, & Bodenhausen, 2012; Todd, Simpson, & Tamir, 2016). By default, outgroup members are represented and processed in ways that accentuate their differences from the ingroup and the self (Ames, 2004a, 2004b; Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Banse, 2005; Todd, Hanks, Galinsky, & Mussweiler, 2011), commonly resulting in biases whereby outgroup members (via their relatively weaker connection to the self) are viewed less favorably than ingroup members (Otten, 2003). Perspective taking can undermine this default tendency, leading perceivers to represent and process outgroup targets more favorably than they otherwise might (Ku et al., 2015; Todd & Galinsky, 2014).

If perspective taking can produce positive shifts in conceptual representations of what outgroup members are like, might it also be capable of positively altering visual representations of what they *look* like? We investigated this possibility in the current research.

### 4. Perspective taking and processing of facial features

How might perspective taking alter visual representations of group members' faces? Prior evidence indicates that, in the absence of perspective taking, visual representations of ingroup faces look more positive and trustworthy than do representations of outgroup faces. Indeed, when compared pixel-by-pixel, visualizations of “trustworthy” faces are more physically similar to visualizations of ingroup versus outgroup faces (Ratner et al., 2014). Of particular relevance here is research linking facial trustworthiness to specific emotion expressions, including positive links to subtle happiness expressions (e.g., upward-turned mouths and open eyes resembling a smile) and negative links to subtle anger expressions (e.g., downward-turned mouths and lowered brows resembling a frown/scowl; Dotsch & Todorov, 2012; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008, 2009; Sutherland et al., 2013). We, therefore, explored whether the visualizations of outgroup faces generated by perspective takers look more trustworthy by virtue of their increased appearance of smiling and/or their decreased appearance of frowning/scowling.

### 5. The current research

The current research examined whether and how perspective taking alters visual representations of ingroup and outgroup members' faces. Our investigation comprised an image-generation experiment followed by seven image-assessment experiments. In the image-generation experiment, participants learned about a minimal ingroup or outgroup target person while actively adopting the person's perspective or while following control instructions. Then, in a reverse-correlation image-

<sup>1</sup> Because such *individual* CIs can be noisy, a common procedure entails aggregating across all the individual CIs in a particular experimental condition to generate a *group* CI reflecting the average visual representation of the participants in that condition. Indeed, most social-cognitive research on visual representations of social groups focuses on these group CIs. We also created group CIs. Given recent evidence that raises concerns about Type I error inflation from using group CIs in the two-phase reverse-correlation procedure (Cone et al., 2020), however, we do not report any analyses of group CIs (details about these analyses are available from the first author on request).

classification task, participants constructed a visual representation of the (ingroup or outgroup) target person. The image-assessment experiments, described in more detail below, assessed these visual representations along various dimensions (e.g., likability, trustworthiness) in new samples of participants who were naïve as to how the visual representations were constructed in the image-generation experiment.

Overall, we expected that ingroup faces would be visually represented more favorably than would outgroup faces (e.g., Ratner et al., 2014). Based on prior evidence that engaging in perspective taking can reduce intergroup biases in conceptual representations (Todd & Galinsky, 2014), we further predicted that perspective taking would temper this pattern of intergroup bias in visual representations. Specifically, we anticipated that adopting an outgroup member's perspective would increase the likability and trustworthiness of outgroup representations. Moreover, we hypothesized that perspective taking would affect subtle facial expressions (i.e., smiling and frowning/scowling) related to approachability, with changes in facial expression representations potentially mediating changes in trustworthiness impressions.

## 6. Image-generation experiment

### 6.1. Method

#### 6.1.1. Participants

To our knowledge, no formal power analysis procedures exist for the image-generation phase in reverse-correlation paradigms (see also Brown-Iannuzzi, Cooley, Marshburn, McKee, & Lei, 2021). Thus, we set our target sample size for the image-generation experiment using a heuristic of at least 60 participants per cell in a  $2 \times 2$  between-subjects design; data were collected until this target number was surpassed. Undergraduates ( $N = 257$ ) participated for course credit. We excluded data from participants ( $n = 3$ ) who did not finish the reverse-correlation task. The final sample comprised 254 White participants (159 women, 95 men;  $M_{\text{age}} = 19.28$ ,  $SD_{\text{age}} = 1.25$ ).

#### 6.1.2. Procedure

In this image-generation experiment and in all subsequent image-assessment experiments, we obtained informed consent from participants prior to their participation. The data for all experiments are available on the Open Science Framework: <https://osf.io/5tqv7/>.

The first task manipulated minimal-group membership (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007). Participants rated their agreement (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*) with items from the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). After a short delay during which the computer purportedly calculated their scores, participants learned that they had either a “green” personality type or an “orange” personality type (in actuality, group membership was randomly assigned). Although no description of the personality types was provided, participants were informed that the personality measure predicts social and financial success and that businesses and scientists use it in hiring and research. In this way, group membership was minimal but likely meaningful for participants. Participants also received a green or an orange wristband to wear for the remainder of the experimental session as a reminder of their group membership (for a similar minimal-group induction, see Simpson & Todd, 2017).

Next, participants wrote a short essay about a typical day in the life of an unknown, gender-matched target person who, depending on condition, had a green or an orange personality type. Thus, the target was an ingroup member for participants with the same personality type and an outgroup member for participants with the other personality type. Participants received one of two sets of instructions for writing their essay (Todd et al., 2016). Instructions in the *perspective-taking* condition encouraged active consideration of the person's mental states:

As you're writing, we ask that you take [his/her] perspective. In your mind's eye, visualize clearly and vividly what [he/she] might be thinking and feeling, and what [his/her] intentions and goals are.

Instructions in the *control* condition encouraged a more objective and detached focus:

As you're writing, we ask that you adopt an objective focus. Try not to get caught up in what [he/she] might be thinking or feeling, or what [his/her] intentions or goals are. Just write as if you were a casual observer.

Participants then completed a 2IFC reverse-correlation image-classification task (Brinkman et al., 2017) during which they generated a visual representation of the target person. On each of 300 trials, participants viewed two adjacent images of degraded faces ( $211 \times 270$  pixels) and selected which face looked more like the target person from the essay-writing task.

The face stimuli were created with the *rcicr* 0.3.4.1 package (Dotsch, 2014) in R (Version 3.6.0; R Core Team, 2019) by superimposing noise patterns onto 2 base faces (1 male, 1 female). The base faces were the neutral-expression male and female faces from the Averaged Karolinska Directed Emotion Face Database (Lundqvist & Litton, 1998). The noise patterns were 4092 superimposed truncated sinusoid patches in all possible combinations of 2 cycles in 6 orientations ( $0^\circ$ ,  $30^\circ$ ,  $60^\circ$ ,  $90^\circ$ ,  $120^\circ$ ,  $150^\circ$ )  $\times$  5 spatial frequencies (1, 2, 4, 8, 16 patches per image)  $\times$  2 phases ( $0$ ,  $\pi/2$ ), with random contrasts. For each trial, we generated a unique noise pattern and combined it with the base face to create one of the two face stimuli. The other face stimulus was the inverse of the noise pattern and the same base face. This technique maximizes the contrast between the two face stimuli presented on each trial (Dotsch & Todorov, 2012). The order of the stimulus pairs and the left-right position of the stimuli in each pair were randomized.

### 6.2. Image processing

Also using the *rcicr* 0.3.4.1 package (Dotsch, 2014), we created 2 types of classification images (CIs) that were later assessed in the image-assessment experiments: individual CIs (used in image-assessment Experiments 1B and 2–4) and subgroup CIs (used in image-assessment Experiments 1A and 5). We generated male and female individual CIs by averaging all the selected noise patterns for each participant and superimposing this noise pattern onto the base face. We did this separately for female and male participants because participants completed the image-classification task with gender-matched base faces.

Next, we created subgroup CIs by following the procedure outlined in Lei et al. (2020). This procedure entails averaging random subsets of individual CIs in each experimental condition, resulting in multiple subgroup CIs per condition. The subgroup-CI approach was developed in response to recent findings suggesting that two-phase reverse-correlation procedures that rely exclusively on group CIs can artificially produce differences between conditions, thereby inflating Type I error (Cone, Brown-Iannuzzi, Lei, & Dotsch, 2020). Preliminary evidence indicates that the subgroup-CI approach, in which multiple aggregated CIs are generated in each condition, controls Type I error when at least 2 subgroup CIs are created per condition (Lei et al., 2020).

We generated male and female subgroup CIs by averaging the selected noise patterns from random subsets of participants, without replacement, in each condition and superimposing this averaged noise pattern onto the base face. Because we had more data for female ( $n = 159$ ) than male participants ( $n = 95$ ), we created 6 subgroup CIs per experimental condition for female participants but 4 subgroup CIs per experimental condition for male participants. Each subgroup CI averaged randomly selected noise patterns from about 6 participants, resulting in a total of 40 subgroup CIs. We settled on this number of subgroup CIs to balance our goals of maximizing the number of stimuli while limiting rater fatigue. We completed this procedure separately for

image-assessment Experiments 1A and 5 to ensure that our results cannot be explained as an artifact of the particular randomization of individual CIs in a given set of subgroup CIs.

## 7. Image-assessment experiments

To test our predictions about the impact of perspective taking on visual representations of ingroup and outgroup faces, we conducted several image-assessment experiments. In Experiments 1A and 1B, a new sample of participants rated the likability of the subgroup CIs and the individual CIs, respectively. Experiments 2A and 2B conceptually replicated Experiments 1A and 1B by using a sequential priming task to examine the interactive effects of group membership and perspective taking on the spontaneously evoked likability and trustworthiness of the individual CIs. Experiment 3 tested whether these effects extend to cooperative behavior in an economic trust game. Experiment 4 explored which of several facial regions (i.e., eyes, mouth) are critical for understanding how perspective taking alters visual representations of group members' faces. Finally, Experiment 5 tested whether subtle differences in smiling or frowning/scowling expressions underlie the effects of perspective taking on the trustworthiness of visual representations of ingroup and outgroup members' faces.

## 8. Experiments 1A and 1B

### 8.1. Method

#### 8.1.1. Participants

Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers (Experiment 1A:  $N = 154$ ; Experiment 1B:  $N = 584$ ) participated for modest pay (Experiment 1A: \$0.55; Experiment 1B: \$0.75). We excluded data from participants who reported not taking the experiment seriously (Experiment 1A:  $n = 8$ ; Experiment 1B:  $n = 47$ ) and who did not finish the entire experiment (Experiment 1A:  $n = 9$ ; Experiment 1B:  $n = 6$ ). The final samples comprised 137 participants in Experiment 1A (75 women, 59 men, 2 non-binary, 1 unreported; 94 White, 14 Black, 12 Asian, 8 Latinx, 2 Native American, 3 reporting other or multiple races/ethnicities, 1 unreported;  $M_{\text{age}} = 35.76$ ,  $SD_{\text{age}} = 10.92$ ) and 531 participants in Experiment 1B (301 women, 226 men, 2 non-binary, 2 unreported; 402 White, 44 Black, 33 Asian, 22 Latinx, 4 Native American, 10 reporting other or multiple races/ethnicities, 9 unreported;  $M_{\text{age}} = 39.88$ ,  $SD_{\text{age}} = 12.89$ ). These samples afforded >80% power to detect two-way interactions with small-to-medium effect sizes (Experiment 1A:  $\eta_p^2 = 0.056$ ; Experiment 1B:  $\eta_p^2 = 0.015$ ; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).

#### 8.1.2. Procedure

Participants in both experiments judged the likability (1 = not at all likable, 7 = very likable) of CIs from each of the four experimental conditions from the image-generation experiment. The CIs appeared one at a time. Instructions encouraged participants to provide their "gut-level" impressions. In Experiment 1A, female participants rated female subgroup CIs ( $n = 24$ ), and male participants rated male subgroup CIs ( $n = 16$ ). In Experiment 1B, male participants rated all 95 individual male CIs. Because there were many more individual female CIs ( $n = 159$ ), we had female participants rate 95 randomly selected female CIs from this

larger set to keep task duration comparable for male and female participants.

## 8.2. Results

### 8.2.1. Subgroup CIs (Experiment 1A)

A 2 (Group Membership)  $\times$  2 (Perspective Taking) repeated-measures ANOVA<sup>2</sup> on the likability of the subgroup CIs in each condition revealed a significant Group Membership main effect,  $F(1, 136) = 196.91$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.59$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.51, 0.66]$ ,<sup>3</sup> whereby the ingroup CIs ( $M = 4.29$ ,  $SD = 1.13$ ) were rated as more likable than were the outgroup CIs ( $M = 3.23$ ,  $SD = 1.18$ ). A significant Perspective Taking main effect,  $F(1, 136) = 31.62$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.19$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.10, 0.28]$ , indicated that the CIs generated by perspective takers ( $M = 3.86$ ,  $SD = 1.23$ ) were rated as more likable than were the CIs generated by control participants ( $M = 3.66$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ). More important for the current research, the predicted interaction was also significant,  $F(1, 136) = 9.29$ ,  $p = .003$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.06$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.01, 0.14]$  (see Fig. 1).

Simple-effects tests indicated that, although robust intergroup bias emerged in both conditions, it was smaller for the CIs generated by perspective takers,  $t(136) = 11.95$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.02$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.82, 1.23]$ , than for the CIs generated by control participants,  $t(136) = 12.98$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.11$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.90, 1.33]$ . Decomposing the interaction differently, the outgroup CIs generated by perspective takers ( $M = 3.39$ ,  $SD = 1.15$ ) were rated as more likable than were the outgroup CIs generated by control participants ( $M = 3.07$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ),  $t(136) =$




Fig. 1. Likability explicitly ascribed to subgroup classification images by group membership and perspective taking in Experiment 1A. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

<sup>2</sup> In all the image-assessment experiments, we conducted analyses reported in the main text at the level of the participant (i.e., image rater) by collapsing across CIs, rather than at the level of the CI by collapsing across image raters. This analysis strategy is the only one reported in studies using subgroup CIs (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2021; Cone et al., 2020); however, both analysis strategies have been reported in studies using individual CIs. Notably, Cone et al. (2020) conducted their analyses at the level of the individual CI. We also report results at the level of the individual CI for Experiments 1B, 2A, 2B, 3, and 4 in the Supplementary Materials.

<sup>3</sup> Following Steiger (2004), we report 90% confidence intervals for effect sizes accompanying  $F$  tests. We used the *effectsize* package (Ben-Shachar, Makowski, & Lüdtke, 2020) to generate both the 90% confidence intervals for the  $\eta_p^2$  estimates and the 95% confidence intervals for the Cohen's  $d$  estimates.



-6.11,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = -0.52$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [-0.70, -0.34]$ . In contrast, the difference in likability of the ingroup CIs generated by perspective takers ( $M = 4.33$ ,  $SD = 1.12$ ) and control participants ( $M = 4.26$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ) was not significant,  $t(136) = -1.47$ ,  $p = .143$ ,  $d = -0.13$ .

### 8.2.2. Individual CIs (Experiment 1B)

An identical 2 (Group Membership)  $\times$  2 (Perspective Taking) repeated-measures ANOVA on the likability of the individual CIs<sup>4</sup> in each condition revealed that the ingroup CIs ( $M = 3.90$ ,  $SD = 0.83$ ) were rated as more likable than were the outgroup CIs ( $M = 3.30$ ,  $SD = 0.79$ ),  $F(1, 530) = 1046.98$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.66$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.63, 0.69]$ , and that the CIs generated by perspective takers ( $M = 3.62$ ,  $SD = 0.85$ ) were rated as more likable than were the CIs generated by control participants ( $M = 3.57$ ,  $SD = 0.88$ ),  $F(1, 530) = 16.07$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.03$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.01, 0.06]$ . Once again, the predicted interaction was also significant,  $F(1, 530) = 91.79$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.15$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.10, 0.19]$  (see Fig. 2).

Simple-effects tests again indicated that, although sizable intergroup bias emerged in both conditions, it was weaker for the CIs generated by perspective takers,  $t(530) = 24.69$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.07$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.97, 1.18]$ , than for the CIs generated by control participants,  $t(530) = 30.95$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.34$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [1.23, 1.46]$ . Approaching this interaction differently, perspective takers' outgroup CIs ( $M = 3.38$ ,  $SD = 0.78$ ) were rated as more likable than were control participants' outgroup CIs ( $M = 3.22$ ,  $SD = 0.80$ ),  $t(530) = -9.69$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = -0.42$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [-0.51, -0.33]$ , whereas perspective takers' ingroup CIs ( $M = 3.87$ ,  $SD = 0.84$ ) were rated as less likeable than were control participants' ingroup CIs ( $M = 3.92$ ,  $SD = 0.81$ ),  $t(530) = 2.99$ ,  $p = .003$ ,  $d = 0.13$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.04, 0.22]$ .




Fig. 2. Likability explicitly ascribed to individual classification images by group membership and perspective taking in Experiment 1B. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

<sup>4</sup> Collecting ratings on the individual CIs afforded the use of more conservative linear mixed-effects models, which can simultaneously account for participant (i.e., image raters) and stimulus (i.e., image generators' CIs) variance. The results of these analyses for Experiments 1B, 2A, 2B, 3, and 4, which generally aligned with the results reported in the main text, appear in the Supplementary Materials. Significant Group Membership  $\times$  Perspective Taking interactions emerged in Experiments 2A, 3, and 4; however, this interaction was non-significant (but in the predicted direction) in Experiments 1B and 2B. Overall, the magnitude of the Group Membership  $\times$  Perspective Taking interaction was weaker when using analyses that simultaneously model random effects of participants and stimuli.

### 8.3. Discussion

These results revealed robust intergroup bias in visual representations of minimal group members' faces, replicating prior work (Ratner et al., 2014) but with a different minimal-group induction. In both image-assessment experiments, the ingroup visualizations were more likable than were the outgroup visualizations, and perspective taking reduced, but did not eliminate, this pattern of intergroup bias. In Experiment 1A, perspective taking increased the likability of the outgroup representations but did not discernibly affect the ingroup representations. In Experiment 1B, however, perspective taking increased the likability of the outgroup representations and decreased the likability of the ingroup representations, relative to the control condition.

### 9. Experiments 2A and 2B

The first two image-assessment experiments revealed that perspective taking reduced biases in the positivity ascribed to visual representations of ingroup faces versus outgroup faces. Both image-assessment experiments, however, used direct measures of trait impressions wherein the image raters explicitly judged the likability of the CIs. Evidence indicates that people form consensual trait impressions of faces after minimal exposure (Willis & Todorov, 2006). People also spontaneously infer traits from faces, even when these inferences are irrelevant to their focal task goal (Klapper, Dotsch, van Rooij, & Wigboldus, 2016). Insofar as face impressions are formed spontaneously, similar effects should emerge on indirect assessments of such impressions.

The next two image-assessment experiments examined spontaneous impressions of likability and trustworthiness using a variant of the stereotype misperception task (SMT; Krieglmeier & Sherman, 2012), a well-validated sequential priming task that assesses the biasing effect of semantic content (e.g., trait impressions) evoked by prime faces on judgments of unrelated target faces. We tested whether the individual ingroup and outgroup CIs generated by perspective takers and control participants (which served as prime faces in the SMT) evoke differential likability (Experiment 2A) and trustworthiness (Experiment 2B).

#### 9.1. Method

##### 9.1.1. Participants

Undergraduates (Experiment 2A:  $N = 165$ ; Experiment 2B:  $N = 250$ ) participated for course credit. We excluded data from participants ( $n = 2$ ) who pressed the same key on every trial in the SMT in Experiment 2B. The final samples comprised 165 participants in Experiment 2A (122 women, 43 men)<sup>5</sup> and 248 participants in Experiment 2B (178 women, 70 men; 124 Asian, 50 Latinx, 40 White, 7 Black, 22 reporting other or multiple races/ethnicities, 4 unreported;  $M_{age} = 20.37$ ,  $SD_{age} = 2.35$ ), which afforded  $>80\%$  power to detect two-way interactions with small-to-medium effect sizes (Experiment 2A:  $\eta_p^2 = 0.047$ ; Experiment 2B:  $\eta_p^2 = 0.032$ ; Faul et al., 2007).

##### 9.1.2. Procedure

Participants in both image-assessment experiments completed variants of the SMT (Krieglmeier & Sherman, 2012) with the following properties. On each trial, a prime face and a target face appeared in quick succession. The prime faces were the gender-matched individual CIs. In addition to the CI primes, we also included neutral primes consisting of a facial outline, as is customary in the SMT. For ease of

<sup>5</sup> Because of a programming error, participant age and race/ethnicity were not recorded in Experiment 2A.

presentation, however, we do not include the neutral primes in the analyses reported below.<sup>6</sup> The target faces were degraded versions of computer-generated facial morphs (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). There were 24 unique facial identities that were morphed to be high or low in likability (Experiment 2A) or trustworthiness (Experiment 2B).

After completing two short practice blocks (5 trials and 10 trials, respectively), participants completed two extended testing blocks (120 trials each). Each trial began with a fixation cross (500 ms), followed by a prime face (i.e., an individual CI; 150 ms), a blank screen (50 ms), and then a target face (100 ms). Finally, a gray pattern mask appeared until participants judged the target face as “more likable” or “less likable” (Experiment 2A) or as “more trustworthy” or “less trustworthy” (Experiment 2B). Trials appeared in random order, and prime CIs of each type appeared equally often with target faces of each type.

Instructions asked participants to attend to and remember the prime faces for a later task, but to avoid letting these prime faces affect their judgments of the target faces. Instructions also urged participants to respond quickly and to use their “gut” feelings when judging the target faces. The proportion of “more likable” or “more trustworthy” judgments after each prime face served as an indirect index of the likability/trustworthiness of those faces. Specifically, spontaneous prime impressions are revealed by their unintended influence on judgments of target likability/trustworthiness (Uleman, 1999).

## 9.2. Results

### 9.2.1. Spontaneous likability (Experiment 2A)

A 2 (Group Membership Prime) × 2 (Perspective Taking Prime) repeated-measures ANOVA on the proportion of individual CIs in each condition that prompted a “more likable” response revealed that the ingroup CI primes ( $M = 0.61$ ,  $SD = 0.19$ ) elicited more likability than did the outgroup CI primes ( $M = 0.57$ ,  $SD = 0.20$ ),  $F(1, 164) = 36.35$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.18$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.10, 0.27]$ .<sup>7</sup> The predicted interaction was also significant,  $F(1, 164) = 18.54$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.10$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.04, 0.18]$  (see Fig. 3).

Simple-effects tests indicated that the ingroup CIs elicited more likability than did the outgroup CIs in both conditions, but this group difference was weaker for the CIs generated by perspective takers,  $t(164) = 2.75$ ,  $p = .007$ ,  $d = 0.21$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.06, 0.37]$ , than for the CIs generated by control participants,  $t(164) = 6.61$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.51$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.35, 0.68]$ . Approaching the interaction differently, perspective takers' outgroup CIs ( $M = 0.58$ ,  $SD = 0.19$ ) elicited more likability than did control participants' outgroup CIs ( $M = 0.56$ ,  $SD = 0.20$ ),  $t(164) = -3.16$ ,  $p = .002$ ,  $d = -0.25$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [-0.40, -0.09]$ , whereas perspective takers' ingroup CIs ( $M = 0.60$ ,  $SD = 0.19$ ) elicited less likability than did control participants' ingroup CIs ( $M = 0.62$ ,  $SD = 0.18$ ),  $t(164) = 2.88$ ,  $p = .004$ ,  $d = 0.22$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.07, 0.38]$ .

### 9.2.2. Spontaneous trustworthiness (Experiment 2B)

An identical 2 × 2 ANOVA on the proportion of individual CIs in each

<sup>6</sup> A typical finding in research using the SMT is that the neutral primes are not evaluatively neutral (Rees, Rivers, & Sherman, 2019; Rivers, Sherman, Rees, Reichardt, & Klauer, 2020), and thus they do not easily serve as a baseline condition. This was also the case in our data. In Experiment 2A, the neutral primes ( $M = 0.47$ ,  $SD = 0.24$ ) spontaneously evoked less likability than did the CI primes generated in each of the experimental conditions ( $ts > 5.57$ ,  $ps < 0.001$ ). Similarly, in Experiment 2B, the neutral primes ( $M = 0.42$ ,  $SD = 0.24$ ) spontaneously evoked less trustworthiness than did the CI primes in each of the experimental conditions ( $ts > 9.72$ ,  $ps < 0.001$ ). Thus, overall, the neutral primes were spontaneously evaluated as less likable (Experiment 2A) and less trustworthy (Experiment 2B) than were all the CI primes.

<sup>7</sup> Preliminary analyses that included Target Face (high likability/trustworthiness vs. low likability/trustworthiness) as a factor indicated that this variable did not moderate the key findings of interest in either Experiment 2A or 2B, as is typical in research using the SMT (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012).




Fig. 3. Proportion of “more likable” responses spontaneously elicited by individual classification images by group membership and perspective taking in Experiment 2A. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

condition that prompted a “more trustworthy” response revealed that the ingroup CI primes ( $M = 0.60$ ,  $SD = 0.18$ ) elicited more trustworthiness than did the outgroup CI primes ( $M = 0.56$ ,  $SD = 0.19$ ),  $F(1, 247) = 49.30$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.17$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.10, 0.24]$ . Once again, the predicted interaction was also significant,  $F(1, 247) = 10.70$ ,  $p = .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.04$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.01, 0.09]$  (see Fig. 4).

Simple-effects tests revealed that the ingroup CIs elicited more trustworthiness than did the outgroup CIs in both conditions, but again this group difference was weaker for the CIs generated by perspective takers,  $t(274) = 4.00$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.25$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.13, 0.38]$ , than for the CIs generated by control participants,  $t(247) = 7.08$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.45$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.32, 0.58]$ . Approaching the interaction differently, perspective takers' outgroup CIs ( $M = 0.56$ ,  $SD = 0.19$ ) elicited more trustworthiness than did control participants' outgroup CIs ( $M = 0.55$ ,  $SD = 0.19$ ),  $t(247) = -2.14$ ,  $p = .033$ ,  $d = -0.14$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [-0.26, -0.01]$ , whereas perspective takers' ingroup CIs ( $M = 0.59$ ,  $SD = 0.18$ ) elicited less trustworthiness than did control participants' ingroup CIs ( $M = 0.60$ ,  $SD = 0.18$ ),  $t(247) = 2.48$ ,  $p = .014$ ,  $d = 0.16$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.03, 0.28]$ .




Fig. 4. Proportion of “more trustworthy” responses spontaneously elicited by individual classification images by group membership and perspective taking in Experiment 2B. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ .

### 9.3. Discussion

These results align with and extend those reported in the first set of image-assessment experiments by documenting that the effects of perspective taking extend to spontaneously evoked impressions of intergroup visual representations. The ingroup visual representations evoked more likability and trustworthiness than did the outgroup visual representations, and engaging in perspective taking dampened this pattern of intergroup bias. Specifically, perspective takers' outgroup representations evoked more likability and trustworthiness, but their ingroup representations evoked less likeability and trustworthiness, relative to the respective visual representations generated by participants in the control condition.

## 10. Experiment 3

Experiment 3 examined whether the effects of perspective taking on intergroup bias in visual representations observed thus far have downstream consequences for overt behavior in an economic trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Chang, Doll, van 't Wout, Frank, & Sanfey, 2010; van 't Wout & Sanfey, 2008). Participants completed a series of modified single-shot trust games with interaction partners represented by the individual CIs. Prior work indicates that people trust ingroup members more than outgroup members in such trust games (Evans & Krueger, 2009), and that this pattern of intergroup bias in trust behavior extends to visual representations of minimal group members (Ratner et al., 2014). Accordingly, we expected that participants would trust partners represented by ingroup CIs more than they would trust partners represented by outgroup CIs, and that perspective taking would attenuate this intergroup bias in trust behavior.

### 10.1. Method

#### 10.1.1. Participants

MTurk workers ( $N = 226$ ) participated for modest pay (\$0.70). All participants also received a bonus (\$0.30) to use in the trust game. We excluded data from participants ( $n = 49$ ) who answered more than one of the three trust game comprehension questions incorrectly.<sup>8</sup> The final sample comprised 177 participants (99 women, 78 men; 124 White, 20 Black, 14 Latinx, 10 Asian, 9 reporting other or multiple races/ethnicities;  $M_{\text{age}} = 36.71$ ,  $SD_{\text{age}} = 11.39$ ), which afforded 80% power to detect a two-way interaction with a small-to-medium effect size ( $\eta_p^2 = 0.044$ ; Faul et al., 2007).

#### 10.1.2. Procedure

Participants completed a series of modified single-shot trust games (Berg et al., 1995) with 95 distinct interaction partners represented by the gender-matched individual CIs. The design and instructions for the trust game were adapted from materials used in prior work (Everett, Faber, Savulescu, & Crockett, 2018). Participants learned that they would play multiple rounds of a decision-making game with numerous different interaction partners, described as MTurk workers who had purportedly provided responses in a previous session. Importantly, participants were told that they would receive a bonus payment based on the responses of one randomly selected interaction partner. In actuality, all participants received a \$0.30 bonus after the experiment. Participants learned that both players were given a \$0.30 bonus to use during the game, and they could transfer any portion of the bonus (from \$0.00 to \$0.30) to their partner. Any portion of the bonus shared would be doubled and sent to the partner, after which the partner could transfer any portion of their total bonus back to the participant.

We informed participants that their partners had indicated in a

<sup>8</sup> Retaining these participants' data did not change the statistical inferences drawn from the results.

previous session, for every possible amount of money transferred to them, how much money they wanted to return to the participant. Before playing the game, participants completed three comprehension questions. If participants cooperate and transfer money to their partner, then both players earn more money. Importantly, cooperating also leaves participants vulnerable, in that partners could keep all the money. Accordingly, the amount of money transferred to the partner captures the extent to which participants trust their partner.

On each round of the trust game, participants saw a photo of their partner, who was represented by a gender-matched individual CI from one of the four conditions based on group membership and perspective taking. We informed participants that the photos had been visually edited for identity protection. Participants completed five practice trials to gain familiarity with the task. As in the previous image-assessment experiments, because there were many more female ( $n = 159$ ) than male ( $n = 95$ ) individual CIs, female participants played a trust game with 95 randomly selected CIs, whereas male participants played the game with all 95 male CIs.

### 10.2. Results

A 2 (Group Membership)  $\times$  2 (Perspective Taking) repeated-measures ANOVA on the average amount of money transferred to the individual CIs in each condition revealed that more money was entrusted to interaction partners represented by the ingroup CIs ( $M = 19.87$  cents,  $SD = 9.07$ ) than to partners represented by the outgroup CIs ( $M = 19.23$  cents,  $SD = 9.31$ ),  $F(1, 176) = 25.77$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.13$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.06, 0.21]$ . The predicted interaction was also significant,  $F(1, 176) = 14.47$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.08$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.02, 0.15]$  (see Fig. 5).

Simple-effects tests indicated that, although partners represented by ingroup CIs were entrusted with more money than were partners represented by outgroup CIs in both conditions, this pattern of intergroup bias was weaker for CIs generated by perspective takers,  $t(176) = 2.32$ ,  $p = .021$ ,  $d = 0.17$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.03, 0.32]$ , than for CIs generated by control participants,  $t(176) = 5.95$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.45$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.29, 0.60]$ . Approaching the interaction differently, perspective takers' outgroup CIs ( $M = 19.37$  cents,  $SD = 9.29$ ) received more money than did control participants' outgroup CIs ( $M = 19.10$  cents,  $SD = 9.36$ ),  $t(176) = -2.40$ ,  $p = .018$ ,  $d = -0.18$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [-0.33, -0.03]$ , whereas perspective takers' ingroup CIs ( $M = 19.69$  cents,  $SD = 9.18$ ) received less money than did control participants' ingroup CIs ( $M = 20.05$  cents,  $SD = 8.98$ ),  $t(176) = 2.77$ ,  $p = .006$ ,  $d = 0.21$ ,  $CI_{95\%} = [0.06, 0.36]$ .




Fig. 5. Mean transfers (in cents) to interaction partners (i.e., individual classification images) by group membership and perspective taking in Experiment 3. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \* $p < .05$ .

### 10.3. Discussion

These results dovetail with those of the previous image-assessment experiments by showing that the effects of perspective taking on intergroup bias in visual representations extend to cooperative behavior in an economic trust game. Although participants transferred more money to interaction partners represented by ingroup CIs than to partners represented by outgroup CIs, perspective taking attenuated this intergroup bias. In line with the previous image-assessment experiments, participants transferred more money to partners represented by perspective takers' outgroup CIs, but less money to partners represented by perspective takers' ingroup CIs, relative to control participants' respective CIs.

## 11. Experiment 4

In the image-assessment experiments reported thus far, perspective taking reduced, but never eliminated, intergroup bias in visual representations; these results emerged in both deliberate and spontaneous impressions of and cooperative behavior with those visual representations. Next, we aimed to localize the critical facial region(s) underlying these effects. Facial trustworthiness has been linked to subtle expressions of approach-related emotions (i.e., happiness) and avoidance-related emotions (i.e., anger) in the eye and mouth regions (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008, 2009). Intergroup differences in representations of both face regions have also been reported in prior research (Paulus et al., 2016; Ratner et al., 2014). To gauge the importance of these face regions in the visual representations under investigation here, we tested whether and how occluding the eyes, the mouth, or both features in the individual CIs would affect trustworthiness impressions (see Rule, Ambady, Adams, & Macrae, 2008, for a similar empirical approach).

### 11.1. Method

#### 11.1.1. Participants

MTurk workers ( $N = 401$ , 204 women, 197 men; 262 White, 77 Black, 28 Asian, 26 Latinx, 8 reporting other or multiple races/ethnicities;  $M_{\text{age}} = 36.08$ ,  $SD_{\text{age}} = 10.68$ ) participated for modest pay (\$0.70). This sample afforded >80% power to detect a three-way interaction with a small-to-medium effect size ( $\eta_p^2 = 0.020$ ; Faul et al., 2007).

#### 11.1.2. Procedure

We modified each of the individual CIs to occlude either the eyes ( $84 \times 248$  pixels), the mouth ( $66 \times 188$  pixels), or both regions, resulting in three different versions of the CIs (eyes-occluded CIs, mouth-occluded CIs, or eyes-and-mouth-occluded CIs; see Fig. 6).<sup>9</sup> Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three occlusion conditions. Instructions urged participants to use their “gut-level” impressions to judge the faces as “more trustworthy” or “less trustworthy” than the average face in the task by pressing one of two response keys. They completed 10 practice trials to gain familiarity with the average trustworthiness of the faces. As before, because there were many more female CIs ( $n = 159$ ) than male CIs ( $n = 95$ ), female participants rated 95 randomly selected female CIs from the larger set, whereas male participants rated all 95 male CIs.<sup>10</sup>

### 11.2. Results

A 3 (Occlusion)  $\times$  2 (Group Membership)  $\times$  2 (Perspective Taking) mixed ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last two factors, on the proportion of individual CIs in each condition that elicited a “more

<sup>9</sup> We created occlusion boxes in MATLAB using the *createMask* function, and we saved the output as a  $512 \times 512$  matrix of logical values.

<sup>10</sup> Because of a programming error, 3 CIs were not rated (1 in the eyes-occluded condition, 2 in the eyes-and-mouth-occluded condition).

trustworthy” response revealed main effects of Group Membership,  $F(1, 398) = 86.54$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.18$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.13, 0.23]$ , and Occlusion,  $F(2, 398) = 5.82$ ,  $p = .003$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.03$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.01, 0.06]$ . The ingroup CIs ( $M = 0.39$ ,  $SD = 0.27$ ) were judged as more trustworthy than were the outgroup CIs ( $M = 0.34$ ,  $SD = 0.25$ ). Additionally, the CIs with both the eyes and mouth occluded ( $M = 0.30$ ,  $SD = 0.27$ ) were judged as less trustworthy than were the CIs with just the eyes occluded ( $M = 0.40$ ,  $SD = 0.25$ ),  $t(1051.60) = -5.86$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = -0.36$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [-0.48, -0.24]$ , and the CIs with just the mouth occluded ( $M = 0.39$ ,  $SD = 0.26$ ),  $t(1044.65) = -5.09$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = -0.31$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [-0.44, -0.19]$ . Trustworthiness impressions for the eyes-occluded CIs and the mouth-occluded CIs did not significantly differ,  $t(1072) = 0.67$ ,  $p = .505$ ,  $d = 0.04$ .

As in the previous image-assessment experiments, the Group Membership  $\times$  Perspective Taking interaction was significant,  $F(1, 398) = 27.94$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.07$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.03, 0.11]$ . Simple-effects tests indicated that the ingroup CIs were judged as more trustworthy than were the outgroup CIs, but once again this pattern of intergroup bias was weaker for the CIs generated by perspective takers,  $t(400) = 4.24$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.21$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.11, 0.31]$ , than for the CIs generated by control participants,  $t(400) = 9.45$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.47$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.37, 0.58]$ . Approaching the interaction differently, perspective takers' outgroup CIs ( $M = 0.35$ ,  $SD = 0.26$ ) were judged as more trustworthy than were control participants' outgroup CIs ( $M = 0.32$ ,  $SD = 0.25$ ),  $t(400) = -4.78$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = -0.24$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [-0.34, -0.14]$ , whereas perspective takers' ingroup CIs ( $M = 0.38$ ,  $SD = 0.27$ ) were judged as less trustworthy than were control participants' ingroup CIs ( $M = 0.40$ ,  $SD = 0.27$ ),  $t(400) = 2.69$ ,  $p = .007$ ,  $d = 0.13$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.04, 0.23]$ .

The Occlusion  $\times$  Group Membership interaction was also significant,  $F(2, 398) = 22.98$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.10$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.06, 0.15]$ . Simple-effects tests indicated that the ingroup CIs were judged as more trustworthy than were the outgroup CIs in the eyes-occluded condition,  $t(275) = 9.25$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.56$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.43, 0.68]$ , and the mouth-occluded condition,  $t(263) = 5.33$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.33$ ,  $CI_{95\%} [0.20, 0.45]$ ; however, this pattern of intergroup bias was not significant in the eyes-and-mouth-occluded condition,  $t(261) = 1.31$ ,  $p = .190$ ,  $d = 0.08$ .

Finally, and of greatest importance, the Occlusion  $\times$  Group Membership  $\times$  Perspective Taking interaction was significant,  $F(2, 398) = 17.30$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.08$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.04, 0.12]$ . To further specify this interaction, we conducted separate 2 (Group Membership)  $\times$  2 (Perspective Taking) ANOVAs in each occlusion condition (see Fig. 7). When just the eyes were occluded, there were main effects of Group Membership,  $F(1, 137) = 69.92$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.34$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.24, 0.43]$ , and Perspective Taking,  $F(1, 137) = 5.05$ ,  $p = .026$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.04$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.002, 0.10]$ , and a Group Membership  $\times$  Perspective Taking interaction,  $F(1, 137) = 53.57$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.28$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.18, 0.38]$ . The pattern of responses underlying this interaction mirrored that found in the previous image-assessment experiments.

When just the mouth was occluded, the Group Membership main effect was significant,  $F(1, 131) = 25.68$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.16$ ,  $CI_{90\%} [0.08, 0.26]$ , but it was not moderated by Perspective Taking,  $F(1, 131) = 1.69$ ,  $p = .197$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$ . When both the eyes and mouth were occluded, however, neither main effect nor the interaction was significant. Together, these results suggest that perspective taking appears to have uniquely altered the trustworthiness with which the mouths of ingroup and outgroup members were visually represented.

### 11.3. Discussion

These results help clarify findings from the previous image-assessment experiments by identifying a particular facial region—the mouth—wherein perspective taking alters intergroup visual representations. Specifically, when just the eyes were occluded, the interactive effects of group membership and perspective taking on the trustworthiness of the visual representations continued to emerge. In conditions where just the mouth was occluded or where both the mouth and the






Fig. 6. Examples of occluded classification images in Experiment 4. Each occlusion box was the same size and placed in the same location for every modified individual classification image.




Fig. 7. Proportion of “more trustworthy” responses explicitly ascribed to individual classification images by occlusion, group membership, and perspective taking in Experiment 4. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ ,  $ns$  = non-significant.

eyes were occluded, however, the positive effects of perspective taking on intergroup trustworthiness were eliminated.

## 12. Experiment 5

The previous image-assessment experiment implicated the mouth as the critical region altered by perspective taking, but it remains unclear how the mouths differed in the visual representations generated by perspective takers and control participants. Impressions of facial trustworthiness are closely connected to subtle expressions of happiness and anger (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008, 2009); thus, perspective taking may have altered the extent to which image generators visualized smiling or frowning/scowling on the group members' faces. In our final image-assessment experiment, we examined the interactive impact of group membership and perspective taking on judgments of smiling and frowning/scowling in a different set of subgroup CIs than what we used in Experiment 1A. We predicted that the ingroup CIs would be judged as smiling more than the outgroup CIs, but that this group difference would be tempered in perspective takers' CIs. In contrast, the outgroup CIs should be judged as scowling/frowning more than the ingroup CIs, but again this difference should be weaker in perspective takers' CIs. We further explored whether smiling or frowning/scowling expressions mediate the effect of perspective taking on the trustworthiness of the ingroup and outgroup CIs.

### 12.1. Method

#### 12.1.1. Participants

MTurk workers ( $N = 151$ ) participated for modest pay (\$0.75). Data were excluded from participants who reported not taking the experiment seriously ( $n = 6$ ) and who did not finish the entire experiment ( $n = 1$ ). The final sample comprised 144 participants (67 women, 73 men, 4 non-binary; 112 White, 12 Black, 9 Asian, 8 Latinx, 1 Native American, 2 reporting other or multiple races/ethnicities;  $M_{age} = 39.00$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.25$ ), which afforded  $>80\%$  power to detect a two-way interaction with a small-to-medium effect size ( $\eta_p^2 = 0.053$ ; Faul et al., 2007).

#### 12.1.2. Procedure

We first created a new set of subgroup CIs from new random subsets of individual CIs using the same procedure as before. Because there were more female than male participants in the image-generation experiment, we generated more female ( $n = 24$ ) than male subgroup CIs ( $n = 16$ ). Each subgroup CI comprised approximately 6 individual CIs.

Participants rated the subgroup CIs, which appeared individually in a randomized order, on smiling, frowning/scowling, and trustworthiness. Male participants rated the male subgroup CIs, whereas female and gender non-binary participants rated the female subgroup CIs. Participants were urged to rely on their first impressions (“go with their gut”). First, participants rated (in counterbalanced order) the extent to which each face appeared to be smiling and frowning/scowling (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). Next, they rated each face on trustworthiness (1 = very untrustworthy, 7 = very trustworthy).

12.2. Results

12.2.1. Smiling

A 2 (Group Membership) × 2 (Perspective Taking) repeated-measures ANOVA on the smiling ratings revealed a significant Group Membership main effect,  $F(1, 143) = 429.63, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.75, CI_{90\%} [0.70, 0.79]$ , whereby the ingroup CIs ( $M = 4.12, SD = 1.06$ ) were rated as smiling more than were the outgroup CIs ( $M = 2.49, SD = 1.05$ ). A significant Perspective Taking main effect,  $F(1, 143) = 12.98, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.08, CI_{90\%} [0.03, 0.16]$ , indicated that the CIs generated by perspective takers ( $M = 3.37, SD = 1.24$ ) were rated as smiling more than were the CIs generated by control participants ( $M = 3.24, SD = 1.42$ ). The predicted Group Membership × Perspective Taking interaction was also significant,  $F(1, 143) = 93.20, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.39, CI_{90\%} [0.30, 0.48]$  (see Fig. 8, left panel).

Simple-effects tests indicated that, although there was robust intergroup bias in smiling ratings in both conditions, it was smaller for the CIs generated by perspective takers,  $t(143) = 14.90, p < .001, d = 1.24, CI_{95\%} [1.03, 1.46]$ , than for the CIs generated by control participants,  $t(143) = 22.43, p < .001, d = 1.87, CI_{95\%} [1.60, 2.15]$ . Exploring this interaction differently, perspective takers' outgroup CIs ( $M = 2.73, SD = 0.99$ ) were rated as smiling more than were control participants' outgroup CIs ( $M = 2.24, SD = 1.05$ ),  $t(143) = -9.74, p < .001, d = -0.81, CI_{95\%} [-1.00, -0.62]$ , whereas perspective takers' ingroup CIs ( $M = 4.00, SD = 1.14$ ) were rated as smiling less than were control participants' ingroup CIs ( $M = 4.23, SD = 0.96$ ),  $t(143) = 4.40, p < .001, d = 0.37, CI_{95\%} [0.20, 0.54]$ .

12.2.2. Frowning/scowling

An identical 2 × 2 ANOVA on the frowning/scowling ratings revealed a significant Group Membership main effect,  $F(1, 143) = 268.43, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.65, CI_{90\%} [0.58, 0.71]$ , whereby the outgroup CIs ( $M = 4.43, SD = 1.11$ ) were rated as frowning/scowling more than were the ingroup CIs ( $M = 2.78, SD = 1.20$ ). A significant Perspective Taking main effect,  $F(1, 143) = 25.99, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.15, CI_{90\%} [0.07, 0.24]$ , indicated that the CIs generated by perspective takers ( $M = 3.50, SD = 1.30$ ) were rated as frowning/scowling less than were the CIs generated by control participants ( $M = 3.72, SD = 1.53$ ). The Group Membership × Perspective Taking interaction was also significant,  $F(1, 143) = 98.92, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.41, CI_{90\%} [0.31, 0.49]$  (see Fig. 8, right panel).

Simple-effects tests indicated that, although intergroup bias in frowning/scowling ratings emerged in both conditions, it was smaller for the CIs generated by perspective takers,  $t(143) = -11.40, p < .001, d = -0.95, CI_{95\%} [-1.15, -0.75]$ , than for the CIs generated by control participants,  $t(143) = -18.53, p < .001, d = -1.54, CI_{95\%} [-1.79,$

$-1.31]$ . Examining the interaction differently, perspective takers' outgroup CIs ( $M = 4.11, SD = 1.05$ ) were rated as frowning/scowling less than were control participants' outgroup CIs ( $M = 4.76, SD = 1.07$ ),  $t(143) = 10.66, p < .001, d = 0.89, CI_{95\%} [0.70, 1.08]$ , whereas perspective takers' ingroup CIs ( $M = 2.89, SD = 1.23$ ) were rated as frowning/scowling more than were control participants' ingroup CIs ( $M = 2.67, SD = 1.17$ ),  $t(143) = -3.45, p < .001, d = 0.29, CI_{95\%} [-0.46, -0.12]$ .

12.2.3. Trustworthiness

An identical 2 × 2 ANOVA on the trustworthiness impressions yielded a significant Group Membership main effect,  $F(1, 143) = 245.38, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.63, CI_{90\%} [0.56, 0.69]$ , whereby the ingroup CIs ( $M = 4.61, SD = 0.86$ ) were rated as more trustworthy than were the outgroup CIs ( $M = 3.26, SD = 1.06$ ). A significant Perspective Taking main effect,  $F(1, 143) = 33.56, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.19, CI_{90\%} [0.10, 0.28]$ , indicated that perspective takers' CIs ( $M = 4.04, SD = 1.07$ ) were rated as more trustworthy than were control participants' CIs ( $M = 3.83, SD = 1.27$ ). Once again, the Group Membership × Perspective Taking interaction was also significant,  $F(1, 143) = 68.98, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.33, CI_{90\%} [0.23, 0.42]$  (see Fig. 9).

Simple-effects tests indicated that, although intergroup bias was evident in both conditions, it was smaller for the CIs generated by




Fig. 9. Trustworthiness explicitly ascribed to the subgroup classification images by group membership and perspective taking in Experiment 5. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. \*\*\* $p < .001$ .




Fig. 8. Smiling and frowning/scowling ratings of subgroup classification images by group membership and perspective taking in Experiment 5. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

perspective takers,  $t(143) = 11.48, p < .001, d = 0.96, CI_{95\%} [0.76, 1.16]$ , than for the CIs generated by control participants,  $t(143) = 16.99, p < .001, d = 1.42, CI_{95\%} [1.19, 1.65]$ . Examining the interaction differently, perspective takers' outgroup CIs ( $M = 3.52, SD = 0.97$ ) were rated as more trustworthy than were control participants' outgroup CIs ( $M = 3.00, SD = 1.08$ ),  $t(143) = -10.71, p < .001, d = -0.89, CI_{95\%} [-1.09, -0.70]$ . Trustworthiness ratings for the ingroup CIs generated by perspective takers ( $M = 4.56, SD = 0.89$ ) and control participants ( $M = 4.67, SD = 0.84$ ), by contrast, did not significantly differ,  $t(143) = 1.92, p = .056, d = 0.16$ .

#### 12.2.4. Moderated mediation with smiling

Next, we tested a moderated mediation model wherein smiling ratings mediated the interactive effect of group membership and perspective taking on the trustworthiness impressions of the CIs. The primary predictor was Group Membership (ingroup = 0.5, outgroup = -0.5), the moderator was Perspective Taking (control = 0.5, perspective taking = -0.5), and the mediator was smiling ratings. Using the *JSmediate* 0.1.1 package, we followed *Yzerbyt, Muller, Batailler, and Judd's (2018)* component (i.e., joint-significance testing) approach, which requires the joint significance of individual parameter estimates of indirect effects to establish the presence of mediation.<sup>11</sup>

The Group Membership  $\times$  Perspective Taking interaction predicted the mediator (i.e., smiling),  $a_{\text{mod}} = 0.72, t(572) = 4.16, p < .001$ , and smiling significantly predicted trustworthiness impressions,  $b = 0.44, t(570) = 13.11, p < .001$ , suggesting the presence of first-stage moderated mediation. The Group Membership  $\times$  Perspective Taking interaction did not significantly predict trustworthiness impressions when controlling for smiling,  $c'_{\text{mod}} = 0.23, t(570) = 1.30, p = .193$ . Further supporting this conclusion, the Monte Carlo confidence interval (derived from 10,000 iterations) for the indirect effect did not contain zero,  $ab = 0.32, CI_{95\%} [0.17, 0.49]$ .

#### 12.2.5. Moderated mediation with frowning/scowling

Finally, we tested a moderated mediation model wherein frowning/scowling ratings mediated the interactive effect of group membership and perspective taking on the trustworthiness impressions of the CIs. We again used the component (i.e., joint-significance testing) approach (*Yzerbyt et al., 2018*).

The Group Membership  $\times$  Perspective Taking interaction predicted the mediator (i.e., frowning/scowling),  $a_{\text{mod}} = -0.87, t(572) = 4.59, p < .001$ , but frowning/scowling did not significantly predict trustworthiness impressions,  $b = -0.03, t(570) = 0.78, p = .438$ , suggesting an absence of first-stage moderated mediation. Further supporting this conclusion, the Monte Carlo confidence interval for the indirect effect contained zero,  $ab = 0.02, CI_{95\%} [-0.04, 0.09]$ .

### 12.3. Discussion

These results indicate that perspective taking changed the extent to which group members' faces were visualized as smiling and frowning/scowling. As predicted, ingroup faces were represented as smiling more than were outgroup faces, but this group difference was weaker for faces generated by perspective takers. Similarly, outgroup faces were represented as frowning/scowling more than were ingroup faces, but this difference was also weaker for faces generated by perspective takers. Adopting an outgroup member's perspective led participants to visualize that person's face as smiling more and frowning/scowling less, whereas adopting an ingroup member's perspective led participants to visualize that person's face as smiling less and scowling/frowning more, relative to the control condition. Furthermore, evidence of moderated mediation emerged, whereby changes in smiling, but not frowning/scowling,

helped explain the interactive effect of group membership and perspective taking on trustworthiness impressions.

## 13. General discussion

The current research investigated whether and how perspective taking alters intergroup biases in visual representations of group members' faces. Using a combination of subgroup and individual classification images (CIs) generated in a reverse-correlation paradigm, and measures of both deliberate and spontaneous impressions and cooperative behavior, we found that faces of minimal ingroup members were visually represented more favorably than were faces of minimal outgroup members (*Ratner et al., 2014*). More important for the current work, perspective taking reduced, but did not eliminate, these patterns of intergroup bias. Relative to participants in a control condition, perspective takers generated more likable and trustworthy outgroup visual representations, which aligns with findings from numerous other studies indicating that perspective taking can increase the favorability of conceptual representations of outgroup members (*Ku et al., 2015; Todd & Galinsky, 2014*). With several exceptions, furthermore, the ingroup visual representations generated by perspective takers were less favorable than were those generated by control participants. This latter finding converges with mounting evidence that perspective taking does not produce uniformly positive effects on judgment and behavior (*Sassenrath, Hodges, & Pfattheicher, 2016; Vorauer, 2013*).

Our final two image-assessment experiments revealed that perspective taking altered visualizations of group members' mouths, specifically the extent to which the target person appeared to be smiling and frowning/scowling. When the CIs' eyes were occluded (but their mouths were visible), perspective taking reduced intergroup bias in trustworthiness impressions. When the CIs' mouths were occluded (but their eyes were visible), by contrast, there was robust intergroup bias in trustworthiness impressions, which aligns with prior work on the importance of the eyes in intergroup cognition (*Kawakami et al., 2017; Xiao, Coppin, & Van Bavel, 2016*). Importantly, however, perspective taking did not temper intergroup bias in this condition. Finally, when the CIs' eyes and mouths were both occluded, no effects involving group membership or perspective taking emerged. The mouth, therefore, appears to be a critical facial region underlying the interactive effect of group membership and perspective taking on target impressions. Perspective takers also visualized outgroup (ingroup) faces as smiling more (less) and frowning/scowling less (more) than did control participants, with changes in the extent of smiling (but not in the extent of frowning/scowling) mediating the interactive impact of group membership and perspective taking on trustworthiness impressions. Future research using eye-tracking could help further corroborate the importance of the mouth by exploring whether differential gaze durations on this facial region predict trustworthiness impressions.

Together, these findings extend the perspective-taking literature into important new theoretical territory: Not only does perspective taking affect conceptual representations of what others are like; it also seems to shape visual representations of what others *look* like. Insofar as these visual representations guide early aspects of intergroup cognition (*Brinkman et al., 2017*), perspective taking may have important top-down influences on the visual processing of ingroup and outgroup faces. Findings from the final two image-assessment experiments, in particular, suggest the intriguing possibility that perspective taking might attenuate the tendency to more readily detect positive emotions on ingroup members' faces and negative emotions on outgroup members' faces (*Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Lazersus, Ingbreten, Stulier, Freeman, & Cikara, 2016*). Future research should explore this possibility.

Insofar as engaging in perspective taking instills a general orientation whereby *any* target person is represented and processed as more "self-like" than they would be in the absence of perspective taking (cf. *Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, & Mitchell, 2008; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce,*

<sup>11</sup> One advantage of the component approach over the frequently used "index" approach (*Hayes, 2013*) is better protection against Type I error inflation.

1996), one might reasonably expect that adopting an ingroup member's perspective would increase ingroup positivity. Contrary to this expectation, however, we found just the opposite: Perspective takers' ingroup visual representations were generally, though not always, less favorable than were those of control participants. This pattern of results aligns more closely with evidence that engaging in perspective taking prompts a deviation from default modes of information processing. On one account (Todd et al., 2016), contemplating another person's mental states initiates a comparison process that entails considering how the person is both similar to and different from oneself (cf. Mussweiler, 2003). For targets initially assumed to be different from oneself (e.g., outgroup members), this comparison process is posited to shine light on previously overlooked self-other similarities, resulting in more projection of (typically positive) self-attributes to these targets than otherwise. For targets initially assumed to be similar to oneself (e.g., ingroup members), however, the comparison process triggered by perspective taking is posited to highlight self-other differences, resulting in less projection of self-attributes to these targets than otherwise.

Although our findings can be accommodated by Todd et al.'s (2016) account, we did not specifically identify the differential projection of self-attributes to ingroup versus outgroup targets as a mechanism underlying the current results. Prior reverse-correlation research, however, indicates that visual representations of ingroup members resemble self-representations more than visual representations of outgroup members do (Imhoff & Dotsch, 2013). Integrating this prior work on visual representations with Todd et al.'s (2016) account of perspective-taking effects on conceptual representations leads to the prediction that perspective taking should increase visual self-projection for outgroup targets but should decrease visual self-projection for ingroup targets, relative to control. Future research should test this prediction.

### 13.1. Limitations and additional directions for future research

We acknowledge several limitations of the current work, which suggest fruitful avenues for future research. First, although our image-assessment experiments consistently revealed that perspective taking altered visualizations of ingroup and outgroup faces, it is important to note that our conclusions rest on a single image-generation experiment. Indeed, this limitation applies to most published research using two-phase reverse-correlation paradigms (but see Hong & Ratner, 2021; Petsko et al., 2020, for exceptions). Because the results of our image-assessment experiments necessarily depend on the psychological processes occurring during the image-generation experiment, future research that replicates the image-generation experiment with a new sample of participants promises to provide more clarity on the robustness of our findings.

Second, we used a new procedure for creating subgroup CIs from random subsets of individual CIs (see also Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2021). This decision was motivated by concerns about the inflation of Type I error in group CIs and by preliminary evidence indicating that using subgroup CIs adequately controls Type I error (Cone et al., 2020; Lei et al., 2020). As is the case with any novel approach, there has been little validation research on the use of subgroup CIs. For instance, subgroup CIs might decrease Type II error by averaging across random noise while boosting the signal in classification images, as has been claimed for group CIs. To our knowledge, however, no research has addressed this question as of yet.

Perhaps more central to the validity of the procedure, we note that no recommendations yet exist for the optimal number of subgroup CIs to use. Nevertheless, results from our image-assessment experiments with subgroup CIs aligned with results from our image-assessment experiments with individual CIs, thereby increasing confidence in the validity of the conclusions drawn from evidence based on this procedure. In addition, we created two different randomly generated sets of subgroup CIs (one set for Experiment 1A, another set for Experiment 5) to ensure that our results were not an artifact of the particular randomization of

individual CIs used for creating a given set of subgroup CIs. Subgroup CIs offer a unique solution for increasing the number of trials included in CIs while retaining some of the variability in the individual data. Future work will be needed to provide clearer guidelines for the optimal use of subgroup CIs in reverse-correlation research.

Another limitation of the current work is that we only examined visual representations of *minimal* ingroup and outgroup members. Because participants had no prior experience with these groups, they necessarily had to construct visual representations of group members' faces on the spot. Although such arbitrarily determined groups are psychologically meaningful (see Dunham, 2018, for a comprehensive review), different effects might have emerged had we used more established, familiar groups (e.g., political groups, racial/ethnic groups) for which stored visual representations are presumably available for retrieval. Insofar as people have multiple visual representations of the same social group in memory (Hinzman & Maddox, 2017), engaging in perspective taking might change which of several representations is retrieved. Future research could address this issue by testing whether perspective taking has comparable effects on the generation of visual representations of familiar and unfamiliar groups.

Moreover, perspective taking may not always have a positive impact on visual representations of outgroup members. Evidence from several studies suggests that perspective taking may fail to positively alter conceptual representations of highly disliked or extremely negatively portrayed outgroup targets (Paluck, 2010; Skorinko & Sinclair, 2013) and can even negatively affect conceptual representations in circumstances of longstanding intergroup conflict (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012). Thus, when initial representations of an outgroup are strongly negative, perspective taking may be ineffectual or may even backfire (Sassenrath et al., 2016; Vorauer, 2013). In such cases, it seems plausible that being instructed to engage in perspective taking might elicit reactance in some perceivers (Berndsen, Thomas, & Pedersen, 2018). Future research that examines the impact of perspective taking on visual representations of strongly disliked groups should be helpful in identifying potential boundary conditions of the effects reported here.

The current findings also raise questions about specifics of the visualization process initiated by perspective taking. Essay task instructions in the perspective-taking condition directed participants to consider the target person's mental states (i.e., thoughts, feelings, intentions, and goals), whereas instructions in the control condition directed participants to imagine the person from an outside perspective (i.e., to ignore these mental states). Given that internal states are only available to the self, perhaps being instructed to imagine another person's internal states encourages the adoption of a first-person perspective, whereas the control instructions encourage the adoption of a third-person perspective (cf. Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Because opposing perspective-taking effects emerged for ingroup and outgroup visualizations, however, it seems unlikely that the distinct impressions elicited by the different task instructions are entirely attributable to adopting a first-person versus a third-person perspective.

A related issue is that essay instructions in the control condition might have inhibited any natural inclinations to engage in perspective taking while writing about the target person. Thus, our findings might say as much (and potentially more) about the absence of perspective taking in the control condition as its presence in the perspective-taking condition. A recent meta-analysis reported evidence that echoes this point: Encountering a person in distress leads people to engage in perspective taking without being prompted to do so, whereas "remain objective" instructions appear to inhibit this tendency (McAuliffe, Carter, Berhane, Snihur, & McCullough, 2020).

Although actively engaging in perspective taking may be the default response to a target person in distress, we contend that it is unlikely to be the default mode of processing a target person who is *not* in distress, as was the case in the current work. In line with this view, previous research examining the effect of perspective taking on the projection of self-attributes to ingroup and outgroup members used a "pure" control



condition and reported results consistent with those observed here: Relative to participants in a condition wherein perspective taking was neither explicitly encouraged nor explicitly discouraged, perspective takers were more likely to use self-knowledge to judge an outgroup member and less likely to use self-knowledge to make inferences about an ingroup member (Todd et al., 2016). Ultimately, we concur with Davis et al. (1996, 2004) that the issue of greatest theoretical importance here is that our two sets of essay task instructions elicited *different* perspective-taking activity.

A final limitation concerns our reliance on participant samples of convenience. Although participants in the image-generation experiment (university students in the midwestern United States) and participants in the image-assessment experiments (MTurk workers and university students in the western United States) were drawn from different regions in the United States, some evidence suggests that the effect of perspective taking on intergroup bias may depend on the relational mobility of a culture. For example, Wang, Lee, Ku, and Leung (2018) found that perspective taking decreased racial stereotyping among participants from relationally mobile cultures (e.g., United States), but it had negligible effects on racial stereotyping among participants from relationally stable cultures (e.g., Singapore). Importantly, this research differs from the current work in focusing on conceptual representations of a group (e.g., Black people) rather than visual representations of an individual (minimal) group member. Nevertheless, this documentation of cultural differences should motivate future research to continue exploring whether perspective taking has distinct effects on intergroup bias in different cultural settings.

## 14. Conclusion

In sum, the current research offers new insights into the effects of perspective taking on intergroup bias. Extending previous findings indicating that perspective taking can reduce various forms of intergroup bias in how group members are conceptually represented (Todd & Galinsky, 2014), our results provide some initial evidence that actively considering group members' mental states may also alter their imagined appearance, resulting in less biased visual representations of their faces.

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## Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104808>.

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